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The Dynamics of A Self-Forming Network
Igor Sobrado and Dave Uhring
Abstract— This article describes our strategy for deploying
self-forming ad hoc networks based on the Internet Protocol
version 6 and evaluates the dynamics of this proposal. Among
others, we suggest a technique called adaptive routing that
provides secure intelligent routing capabilities to computer com-
munication networks. This technique uses the flow label, supports
hybrid metrics, network load sharing, and is not restricted to
evaluation of performance on first hop routers when making
routing decisions. Selective anycasting is an extension to the
anycast addressing model that supports exclusion of members
of groups that perform poorly or inappropriately on a per-host
basis. Distributed name lookup is suggested for integrating self-
forming and global networks where they coexist. At last, we pose
an address hierarchy to support unmanaged discovery of services
in unknown networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
SELF-FORMING ad hoc computer networks [1] will be-come an active research field in the coming years. As
other self-organizing networks, these networks are able to
respond to hostile actions such as Denial of Service (DoS) and
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks more efficiently
than traditional networks. This ability is useful for deploying
unmanaged computer networks. Self-forming networks are
an adequate platform to deploy proposals like intelligent au-
tonomous agents [2] that require some degree of survivability
in the network infrastructure.
A fault tolerant network like the one suggested above
requires intelligent routing capabilities and a technique for
discovering and allocating resources in a unmanaged and non-
centralized way. Requirements include:
• Reliable, fault tolerant, communication networks support-
ing an intelligent routing framework and redundancy;
• Discovery of devices offering services in a dynamic
networking environment, in an unmanaged way;
• Integration with existing network infrastructures where
available, supporting a world-wide reaching technique;
• Automatic configuration of devices; and, finally,
• A secure network infrastructure.
In this paper we propose a technique, called adaptive
routing, that provides secure intelligent routing capabilities to
computer networks at an autonomous system (AS) level. This
technique, based on the use of the flow label field, resolves
the security issues associated with other routing proposals in
a simple and elegant way. Selective anycasting increases the
robustness of anycast addressing, enabling hosts to selectively
reject those members of anycast groups that do not fit their
requirements but are still alive.
The most important contributions of this manuscript are
the development of a secure intelligent routing infrastructure
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for computer communication networks, and an extension to
anycasting that significantly increases the robustness and reli-
ability of this addressing model. Discovery of services and a
distributed name lookup mechanism, presented initially in [3]
for the automatic configuration of IPv6 devices, is applied to
self-forming networks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II we introduce related work. Section III describes the
notational conventions used in this article. Section IV outlines
our proposal for deploying self-forming ad hoc networks at a
theoretical level. Section V provides a performance evaluation
of our prototype when compared with current fixed networks.
Section VI presents the security weaknesses commonly found
on ad hoc networks and, more specifically, self-forming net-
works, and how our proposal manages those security issues.
Some possible research lines are shown in Section VII. Finally,
conclusions are outlined in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
The Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) [4], [5] is a good
foundation for deploying self-forming computer networks.
This communication protocol provides hierarchical addresses
and is a key element for supporting safe intelligent routing
using the flow label field. This section provides an overview
of research efforts related with our proposal.
• The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCPv6) [6]
allows passing configuration parameters such as network
addresses, netmasks, and hostnames to network nodes
from a DHCP server.
• The flow label field [7] enables classification of packets
belonging to a specific stream by the 〈label, src, dst〉
triplet. This field can be used by the packet classifier in
a router to efficiently forward traffic for a particular data
stream. As routers do not need to parse the option head-
ers, packets can be processed faster, increasing effective
routers throughput.
• Intelligent route controllers [8]–[10] are appliances that
make routing decisions for multi-homed connections im-
plementing route changes in Border Gateway Protocol
(BGP) [11] routers. Currently, non-BGP routing is a cost
effective solution for networks that do not want to run a
routing protocol as complex as BGP. An intelligent route
controller optimizes traffic routed from a subset of the
Internet address space to a set of non-overlapping regions
called clusters.
• The Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) [4]
REDIRECT messages are used by routers to inform other
nodes of a better first hop toward a destination. Con-
sidered harmful by security concerned sites, REDIRECT
messages are not honored by most routers.
2TABLE I
NOTATIONAL CONVENTIONS USED IN THIS PAPER
Symbol Definition
P = (p0; p1, p2, . . . , pn) set of parameters that define the
requirements*of a packet stream;
pi is the weight of the i-th parameter
Ri = {ri1, r
i
2, . . . , r
i
ni
} i-th route discovered in the ad hoc network;
ri
j
is the j-th intermediate system in the
route; ni is the number of intermediate
systems in that route
ri → rj link between intermediate systems ri and rj
wi(p0; p1, p2, . . . , pn) total cost of the i-th route
wi
j
(p1, p2, . . . , pn) cost of the j-th intermediate system, rij
wopt(p0; p1, p2, . . . , pn) lower cost found
*For example: bandwidth, latency, number of hops...
• The routing extension header [12] is an IPv6 header
option used to route packets, either strictly or loosely,
from a source to a destination host. It is assumed that,
as the ICMPv6 REDIRECT messages, the routing header
is a security concern as a consequence of a lack of an
authentication mechanism.
As a difference with intelligent route controllers, we propose
making intra-AS routing decisions. Our proposal is intended to
complement, not to replace, intelligent route controllers. From
all the above, we conclude that both the ICMPv6 REDIRECT
messages and the routing extension header are not adequate
mechanisms to achieve intelligent routing. Instead, we suggest
using a secure mechanism to modify the interface to which a
flow label is assigned.
III. NOTATIONAL CONVENTIONS
Let us define the set of intermediate systems in the i-th route
discovered by the route servers as Ri = {ri1, ri2, . . . , rini},
where rij is the j-th intermediate system in this route. Routes
are calculated to minimize the cost, wj , for a set of parameters
P = (p0; p1, p2, . . . , pn). In this paper ri → ri+1 denotes a
link between intermediate systems ri and ri+1. This link is not
bidirectional; in other words, ri+1 → ri is a different link in
our simulation. We pose the notation ri ↔ ri+1 to denote both
links simultaneously. A brief outline of notational conventions
used in this manuscript is provided in Table I.
IV. ADAPTIVE COMPUTER NETWORKS
One of the goals of a self-forming ad hoc computer network
is being able to response to a changing environment (e. g.,
degrading softly under a DoS attack). Both automatic discov-
ery of services and adaptive routing are powerful tools for
responding to the challenges introduced by dynamic network
topologies. The former is based on the use of reliable anycast
groups and service oriented IPv6 addresses; the latter on route
servers (RSes) and flow labels. We suggest using a distributed
name service for integration between self-forming and fixed
networks. This naming service allows nomadic networks to be
reachable without using tunnels. The use of a local namespace
on each device for allocating services discovered simplifies
application management.
A. Discovery of Services
As outlined in [3], anycasting [13], [14] with service
oriented IPv6 addresses1 can be used to build a framework
for the automatic discovery of machines offering services.
The unicast addresses of those machines can be added to
local namespaces in each self-configurable device to simplify
configuration of applications. Selective anycasting, described
below, can greatly improve reliability of anycast addressing.
B. Overlay Networks
Distributed name lookup (DNL) [3] is a name resolu-
tion technique useful for reaching nodes of a self-forming
nomadic network where access to a global communication
infrastructure is possible. DNL splits name resolution in two
tasks that will run on probably different nameservers. In fact,
DNL makes forward resolution in the base network (i. e., the
network of the mobility provider) and reverse translation in
the network where the mobile devices reside. These temporary
resource records cannot be transferred to slave nameservers.
C. Adaptive Routing
We suggest using RSes, supporting hybrid metrics for route
optimization, and an intelligent routing based on the flow label
field. Hybrid metrics allow routing infrastructure to assign a
cost to each intermediate system that depends on more than
one parameter. Each parameter can have a different weight in
the estimation of the cost.
1) Combining Multiple Metrics in a Single (Hybrid) Metric:
RSes can assign a cost to each intermediate system as a
function of the requirements for packet forwarding for a
given data stream (e. g., high bandwidth, low latency, . . .).
Let us define the total cost wj(p0; p1, p2, . . . , pn) for a route
Rj = {rj1, r
j
2, . . . , r
j
nj
} as:
wj(p0; p1, p2, . . . , pn)
def
=
p0
bj
+
nj∑
i=1
w
j
i (p1, p2, . . . , pn) , (1)
where P = (p0; p1, p2, . . . , pn) is a set of parameters that
define the requirements of the hybrid metric; in this equation,
bj = min
1≤i≤nj
b
j
i (2)
is the end-to-end effective bandwidth between the source
and destination hosts (bji is the available bandwidth in the
intermediate system rji ); wji (p1, p2, . . . , pn) is the cost2 of rji
in the route Rj for P . The best path discovered is the one
that minimizes the end-to-end cost:
wopt(p0; p1, p2, . . . , pn) = min
∀j
wj(p0; p1, p2, . . . , pn) . (3)
Table II shows a subset of end-to-end metrics that can be used
to calculate the cost of a route between two hosts.
1Where the host portion of the IPv6 address has been replaced by a service
identifier field.
2p0, the weight assigned to the bandwidth requirement, must be applied to
the effective bandwidth for the end-to-end route. This parameter cannot be
applied to the throughput on each intermediate system.
3TABLE II
METRICS FOR END-TO-END PERFORMANCE ESTIMATION
Mathematical Expression
Symbol Quantity Unitsfor this metric
bj available bandwidtha bj = min1≤i≤nj b
j
i
kB · s−1
multiple communication cost


price,
reliability,
security,
etc . . .
N/A
t delayb tj =
∑nj
i=1
t
j
i
s
∆t jitterc ∆tj =∑nj
i=1
∆tj
i
, s
where ∆tj
i
= tj
i
− t˜j
i
is the
delay variation in rj
i
ni number of hops N/A none
aFor file transfer protocols.
bFor interactive applications (e. g., TELNET).
cFor multimedia streams.
2) Routing Packets: Intelligent routing can usually be
abused to gain access to networks whose firewalls are poorly
configured. Therefore, routing decisions should not be made
by untrusted third parties (e. g., hosts) but from authenticated
devices. For adaptive routing, we suggest the use of RSes
that will try to discover the route that best fits the set of
requirements P for a data stream between two nodes of the
self-forming network. These devices must be authorized to
modify the interface assigned to a flow label on routers.
Routers supporting this feature are called adaptive routers
in this article. Adaptive routers can monitor their network
interfaces looking for communication failures; if a failure
is detected, adaptive routers can ask an authorized RS for
an alternative route to the destination host. RSes can use a
keep-alive mechanism to ascertain the availability of adaptive
routers. An adaptive router that stops responding to the re-
quests of a RS is an indication of a network failure too.
3) Selective Anycasting: Let us suppose that one of the
members of the anycast group is not performing as expected.
The members of the self-forming network should have a
chance to reject nodes that are inadequate or deficient. Existing
keep-alive mechanisms cannot detect members that behave
poorly or inappropriately but are still alive. Our proposal is
using a members exclusion header (EH) to provide a list of
machines that should not be contacted3. To protect clients of
the self-forming network against variations in the routing path
as a consequence of changes in the network topology, we
suggest using the unicast addresses assigned to the members
of the anycast group instead of its relative position in the
routing path. Anycast addresses can be translated to unicast
ones, using either anycast address mapper or the source
identification option [15]. Each time an entry is added to the
EH, a new data stream must be established; as a consequence,
a new flow label is calculated by the source host. This header
should be under the control of end-user nodes because:
• Routers are not designed for network analysis; and,
• Applications have the ability to decide if a member of an
anycast group is performing adequately, and should have
3As anycast addresses are assigned to routers [13] to simplify routing, this
extension header does not require support in the members of the groups.
a chance to reject those members that does not.
Selective anycasting is a lightweight extension to the any-
casting addressing model that does not introduce overhead in
routing if flow labels are used4.
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Fig. 1. A Fluid Mechanics analogy to Selective Anycasting
Fig. 1 outlines an analogy between selective anycasting
and a simple mechanical set-up. Let us suppose that an
incompressible Newtonian fluid flows in a continuous stream
on the pipeline described in this figure. Joints in this pipeline
are comparable to anycast routers. Each duct has a valve that
acts as a control device for conveying the Newtonian fluid
in the experimental device. These valves close temporarily an
orifice that permits the movement of fluid to the “members of
the anycast group”, in the lower part of the figure. Initially, all
valves are open, allowing the incompressible fluid to convey
to the nearest member of the anycast group from the point
of view of the pipeline topology. In our analogy, adding the
unicast IP address assigned to a member of the group to the
EH is like closing the valve in the duct that joints that member
to the main pipeline. Without those valves, the fluid that flows
on the pipeline has no chance to be carried to other members
of the anycast group. In our scenario nodes whose IP addresses
are in the set S = {IP1, IP2, . . . , IPi−1} had been excluded
by closing the valves in the ducts that join them to the pipeline.
These nodes will not be reached until valves are open again
(i. e., until their addresses are removed from the EH and a
new packet stream to the anycast group is established).
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We used the ns Network Simulator [16], [17] for testing
the proposal outlined in this manuscript. Our prototype was
developed using the Object Tcl [18] programming language,
an extension to the Tool Command Language (Tcl) [19] for
dynamic object-oriented programming. In this Section, we
describe the experimental set-up used to test our intelligent
routing model and provide performance metrics for our pro-
totype when compared to standard routing proposals.
A. Description of the Prototype
The aim of our simulation is estimating the ability of our
proposal to recover connectivity when compared to standard
routing algorithms after a part of the network has been
damaged; consequently, the network topology assures the
existence of more than one valid route between the source
and destination hosts. We simulate a damaged link between
4Flow labels are required for adaptive routing, not for selective anycasting.
4intermediate systems ri and rj by turning down the links
ri ↔ rj simultaneously. Same failure conditions are applied
for all routing proposals evaluated in this article.
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Fig. 2. Changing the Interface assigned to a Flow Label in our Prototype
Fig. 2 shows how we have implemented the flow label
updating mechanism in ns. Let us suppose that an intermediate
system ri has two output interfaces, ri → ri+1 and ri → r˜i+1,
both of them valid routes toward a destination host. To route
traffic to one of these interfaces our prototype turns down all
the output links except the one that will carry the data stream.
In this scenario, both ri+1 → ri and r˜i+1 → ri remain up
to allow acknowledgments (ACKs) reaching the host that has
sent the packets through the link ri → ri−1. Our simulation
uses a distance vector (DV) routing algorithm.
B. Performance Evaluation
The goal for our routing proposal is not performance but
reliability. On the other hand, intelligent routing is a powerful
tool for increasing network performance, allowing routing
infrastructure to make routing decisions based on a global
network state, instead of first neighbors feedback.
Figs. 3 up to 8 illustrates the performance of TCP Reno,
a selective acknowledgment (SACK) TCP sender, TCP Tahoe,
TCP Vegas, and our adaptive routing proposal. Fig. 6 depicts
network dynamics when a permanent link failure is detected by
an adaptive router and announced to a RS. Scenario outlined
in Fig. 7 is a variant of the previous one; in this case,
both a standard router and an adaptive router are unreachable
after the link failure. A higher delay in recovering network
connectivity in the self-forming network is observed because
a new route is not calculated by the RS before the keep-alive
mechanism ascertains that the adaptive router is not available.
Finally, Fig. 8 depicts the effect of a short loss of connectivity.
When the adaptive route detects the network failure it sends
a request to update the route followed by data streams to a
RS. Both a fast response (FR) from the RS, received before
connectivity is recovered, and a slow response (SR), received
after recovering normal network conditions, are compared with
the performance of TCP Reno in same network conditions.
VI. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
Joining anycast and multicast groups in a secure manner
[20], [21] is a requirement for supporting current networking
services. Authentication of the members of anycast groups
is required for discovery of services. Selective anycasting
provides reliable and fault tolerant anycast groups.
Adaptive routing works for self-forming networks with an
internal packet forwarding mechanism. It is a secure approach
to intelligent traffic routing because:
Fig. 3. Throughput for Standard TCP in the first Scenario
Fig. 4. Throughput for Standard TCP in the second Scenario
Fig. 5. Throughput for Standard TCP in the third Scenario
1) The exact route is not under control of network nodes;
2) Only authorized RSes are able to change the route on
the routers enabled to support this feature.
As both authentication of RSes and a relatively updated
knowledge of network topology is required, intelligent routing
must be done at an AS level. Contacting with anycast groups
of RSes in other ASes allows this proposal to be extended to
a global computer network like Internet.
VII. FUTURE WORK
We suggest improving the synchronization mechanism be-
tween adaptive routers and RSes. Detection of changes in the
network topology as soon as occur is an important goal. The
development of a keep-alive mechanism between RSes and
adaptive routers will contribute to detection of network failures
that isolate adaptive routers from the rest of the network.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Survival from failures in communication infrastructure and
attacks against networking equipment requires development
of robust, fault tolerant, computer communication networks.
This article proposes some techniques to improve reliability of
current communication frameworks and support construction
of self-forming ad hoc computer networks. Our main contri-
butions are:
5Fig. 6. Throughput for the Flows in the first Scenario
Fig. 7. Throughput for the Flows in the second Scenario
Fig. 8. Throughput for the Flows in the third Scenario
• The development of an anycast addressing extension to
allow applications to reject those members of anycast
groups that are not performing adequately, but are still
alive; and,
• A framework, based on IPv6 flow labels, that provides
intelligent routing capabilities to computer networks.
Other techniques we have developed in the last years are
suggested for integration with fixed networks and for the
unattended configuration of devices.
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